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Patterns of Knowledge Communities 
in the Social Sciences 
ROBERTPAHRE 
~ S T R A C T  
THESTUDY OF SCIENCE AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES is dominated by philosophies 
and sociologists. These disciplines naturalIy take different approaches to the 
subject, the one epistemological and the other sociological. While recogniz- 
ing the role of society in shaping science, this article emphasizes the way that 
the epistemology of science influences scientific society. The epistemologi- 
cal status of various scientific discourses also shapes scientific communities. 
Discourses about methods have different effects on communities than dis- 
courses about theories; positivist discourses and nonpositivist discourses also 
shape communities differently. The best way to think about science and 
scientific communities is a dialogue between two hybrid approaches-i.e., a 
social epistemology and an epistemological sociology. Each presents some 
challenges to information science. 
INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge is found in communities built by individuals. Our efforts to 
systematize, categorize, or reorganize that knowledge must consider not only 
the individual knower but also the knowledge communities. In other words, 
studying knowledge presents a sociological problem in addition to an intel- 
lectual or philosophical one.’ For this reason, most contemporary studies of 
science treat science purely as a sociological issue. 
In contrast to this literature, it will be argued here that knowledge 
communities present not just a sociological problem. The substance of 
science, and what is labeled here as the “epistemology” of science,2 affects 
the pattern by which scientific knowledge is organized. In particular, the 
epistemological status of a scientific discourse shapes the sociological struc- 
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ture of a scientific community. To understand knowledge communities, 
then, we need an epistemological sociology (ES) of science. This ap- 
proach joins both the social and intellectual reasons why knowledge com- 
munities look the way they do. 
While a polemical argument is made for such a sociology elsewhere 
(Pahre, 1995),this article will evaluate both the sociological and the epis- 
temological reasons for the pattern of scientific organization, generally 
with reference to the social sciences. Four perspectives toward the prob- 
lem of understanding disciplines and cross disciplinary research are dis- 
cussed: (1)a purely epistemological approach, (2) a purely sociological 
approach, (3) a social epistemology, and (4) an epistemological sociol- 
ogy. These perspectives are lenses through which we can see different 
aspects of the organization of knowledge. Because neither of the two 
pure approaches is adequate for understanding how knowledge is orga- 
nized, our studies of disciplines must be interdisciplinary. 
Within this general project, special attention will be given to the twin 
issues of boundaries and boundary crossing. After all, being a commu- 
nity entails having boundaries of some sort, whether they take the form 
of walls or transitional zones between one community and another. In-
formation science must deal with both intraboundary and interboundary 
communities. For instance, cataloging is an attempt to get the bound- 
aries right, while reference librarianship must inevitably confront bound- 
aries that are useful for one purpose and yet hinder the information search 
at hand. This is especially important because innovative knowledges are 
most likely in exactly those areas that are most difficult to classify and 
organize (Dogan 8c Pahre, 1990). 
Like other contributors to this issue (see Dogan’s and Klein’s articles in 
this issue of Library Trends), the goal here is to describe patterns of knowl- 
edge creation today and not to propose how information science can meet 
the needs of the knowledge creators (for a discussion of this topic, see Palmer’s 
and Searing’s articles in this issue of Library Trends). Simultaneously, the 
pattern of knowledge creation and organization has implications for infor- 
mation science that will be touched upon throughout this article. Where 
there are epistemological reasons for a given pattern of scientific organiza- 
tion, then these presumably provide us with good reasons for organizing 
information services around them. Where scientific communities are orga- 
nized for (nonepistemological) sociological reasons, the solution to prob- 
lems of information will be less clear cut because intellectual and social prin- 
ciples of organization do not coincide.3 
A PURELY APPROACHEPISTEMOLOGICAL 
TO KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITIES 
For the most part, university curricula and administrative divisions 
assume the existence of coherent fields of knowledge and groups of fields 
within identifiable boundaries. The naive view is that these fields and the 
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boundaries around them are found in nature: the objects of natural sci- 
ence are distinct from those of social science, pure science is epistemo- 
logically distinct from applied science, and scientific knowledge is dis- 
tinct from nonscientific knowledge. These are “epistemological” claims 
about scientific communities since the alleged division between pure sci- 
ence and applied science rests on the difference between an epistemol- 
ogy appropriate to the search of knowledge for its own sake as opposed 
to an epistemology for seeking knowledge as a means to another end. 
The existence of epistemological distinctions between kinds of knowl- 
edge or between the disciplines also finds more sophisticated expression 
among philosophers. For instance, Steve Fuller (1988) argues that disci- 
plines are bounded by their procedures for adjudicating rival knowledge 
claims (p. 191). In particular, a discipline’s argumentation format re- 
stricts word usage, whetherjustification may rely on reason alone or must 
use technically aided perception and so on. Presumably, different proce- 
dures cluster into disciplines, providing an epistemological explanation 
for the pattern of disciplinary organization. This is essentially Julie Th- 
ompson Klein’s (1990) definition of a discipline: “[Tlhe tools, methods, 
procedures, exempla, concepts, and theories that account coherently for 
a set of objects or subjects” (p. 104). 
Still, many have rightfully asked whether the alleged boundaries be- 
tween science and nonscience, pure science and applied science, or natu- 
ral science and social science, can be philosophicallyjustified. The bound- 
ary between science and pseudoscience, for instance, does not rest on 
the normal demarcation criteria that many scientists believe it does. 
Paranormal research programs present models with testable hypotheses, 
for instance, while those who accuse such research programs of fraud do 
not themselves meet the traditional standards of “science” (Collins & 
Pinch, 1979; Pinch, 1979). It is also notoriously difficult to distinguish 
pure and applied science because: “The intellectual procedures adopted 
in pure and applied research are frequently indistinguishable and the 
scientific results often identical” (Mulkay, 1977, p. 95). As for the natural 
and social sciences, I cannot imagine criteria that would classify, for ex- 
ample, Jane Goodall as a natural scientist studying unknowing objects 
and quantitative economists as social scientists studying knowing object^.^ 
There are good reasons why such attempts to define boundaries 
should fail. These attempts are a variation of foundationalism within 
philosophy more generally, and analogous to the search for first prin- 
ciples on which to ground a (normative) philosophy of science. The 
trend of twentieth-century philosophy has, of course, been away from 
foundationalism. Among those reasons relevant here is that  
foundationalist philosophies of science unavoidably rest on empirical 
claims and prelogical judgments in order to justify their prescriptions for 
how scientists should engage in science (e.g., see Giere, 1985). For in- 
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stance, crude empirical claims about the “success” of physics in explain- 
ing the world have had an enormous effect on notions of what a norma- 
tive philosophy of science must allow (or prescribe) .5 Judging by past 
efforts, a philosophy absent from some such nonphilosophical founda- 
tions is impossible. 
As an empirical matter, foundational explanations would expect a 
relatively static organization of scientific disciplines, since the justifica- 
tions for dividing the disciplines are, by definition, unchanging. This is 
very much at odds with reality,6 where interdisciplinary centers, institutes, 
programs, and even colleges and universities abound (Dogan & Pahre, 
1990; Klein, 1990). Pure philosophy would reject such an empirical test 
as illegitimate, of course. Yet, if some empirical claims inevitably lie be- 
hind any philosophy, then alternative empirical claims about the nature 
of disciplines do present a legitimate criticism of even the purest pre- 
scriptive philosophy of science. 
While we should be suspicious of claims that disciplinary divisions 
exist in nature, they certainly do seem to influence the definition of disci- 
plines. Divisions between “pure” and “applied” fields are ubiquitous in 
the physical sciences (science versus engineering), biological sciences 
(biology versus medicine), and social sciences (economics/business ad- 
ministration, sociology/social work, political science/policy studies). One 
reason these divisions exist is that asserting epistemological divisions is 
an important part of scientists’ “boundary work (Gieryn, 1983). Thus, it 
is not too surprising that this apparently “intellectual” division probably 
makes more sense sociologically. Pure scientists produce for an audience 
of other researchers and are supposed to choose topics based on scien- 
tific “significance” (however defined). Applied researchers produce for 
a nonresearcher audience things of practical usefulness (or things that a 
nonresearcher audience is willing to fund as if practically useful). 
These audience effects shape the communities and their boundaries.’ 
This sociological reality of science presents a serious challenge to any 
purely epistemological attempt to understand disciplines and other forms 
of knowledge communities (e.g., see Becher, 1990; Campbell, 1979; 
Gieryn, 1983; Huber, 1990; Pinch, 1990). 
A PURELY A~PROACH COMMUNITIESSOCIOLOGICAL TO KNOWLEDGE 
If epistemology cannot explain them, then perhaps a sociological 
approach is the best way to understand knowledge communities. Unfor- 
tunately, the classical sociology of science was more a sociology of scien-
tists than a field which problematizes knowledge. For Robert Merton 
and his disciples (i.e., Merton, 19’73; Ben-David, 1973; Zuckerman, 1977), 
science is a particular form of social activity, where (in a Parsonian way) 
existing norms structure the roles filled by individual scientists coming 
from a variety of social backgrounds and forming various kinds of 
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networks. The internal allocation of rewards in science exerts a powerful 
influence on scientific recruitment, socialization, and knowledge produc- 
tion, as do professional networks, hybrid fields and scholars, journals, 
reading and citation patterns, or the (dis) integration of scientific special- 
ties (i.e., Crane, 1972; Mullins, 1973; Chubin, 1976; Mulkay, 1977; Dogan 
& Pahre, 1990). External belief systems, such as Puritanism or democ- 
racy, might also help or hinder the spread of science by supporting cer- 
tain norms (Merton, 1938/1970, 1973). 
This approach usually does not seek to explain the substance of science, 
generally assuming that science progresses, and that each generation pro- 
vides a successively better account of reality. Their inattention to the sub-
stance of science stems in large part from a belief that “true” scientific beliefs 
are best explained by their truth; only “false” beliefs need sociological expla- 
nation. Laudan (1977) calls this the arationality assumption, by which he 
means that “the sociology of knowledge may step in to explain beliefs if and 
only if those beliefs cannot be explained in terms of their rational merits” (p. 
202). This is a profoundly ahistorical assumption, for it means that any 1950s- 
era sociology of knowledge would have been precluded from studying con- 
temporary geology, while those writing after the tectonic revolution can pro- 
vide a sociological account of geology as it was in the 1950s. Now, of course, 
those in the sociology of knowledge field are (temporarily) prohibited from 
studying scientists who believe in plate tectonics. Given such problems, this 
author rejects the claim that only false beliefs need explanation. In any case, 
it is more interesting to study the sociological conditions for “true” claims 
and the conditions affecting the variation between truth and falsity in knowl- 
edge claims. 
While interesting, it is not immediately obvious why a sociology of 
“true” belief systems is possible. There are two major reasons why a soci- 
ology of knowledge is both possible and interesting-one epistemologi-
cal and the other sociological. The epistemological reason is the Duhem- 
Quine thesis that scientific theories are underdetermined by the evidence 
because more than one theory fits any given set of evidence. “Facts,” too, 
are equivocal, embedded in a particular research program or paradigm. 
No apparent anomaly can destroy a scientific research program since sci- 
entists may make the anomaly disappear by distrusting scientific instru- 
ments, restricting the domains of theories, and so on (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 
1970). This thesis implies that factors other than evidence-presumably 
including social factors-determine the content of scientific theories. 
Karl Mannheim (1936) first noticed the sociological reason why a 
sociology of knowledge is interesting. He indicated that granting the 
truth of any knowledge claim benefits some people at the expense of 
others. Since any epistemic claim benefits some at the expense of others, 
the process of epistemic justification is really just another way of distrib- 
uting power. This is especially clear when we consider how certain do- 
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mains of socially important knowledge, such as law or medicine, have 
been delegated to experts (Fuller, 1987). The creation of disciplines, 
too, served various social interests at particular moments in time (see 
Wallerstein, 1991). These disciplines and professions are far from 
epistemically “efficient”; after all, if one could start over and design intel- 
lectual boundaries for the current corpus of knowledge, surely one would 
not choose precisely the set of boundaries that we have today (Fuller, 
1988, pp. 195-97; Whitley, 1986). 
Where Mannheim (and his followers) erred was in assuming that, 
because someone benefits from the acceptance of any knowledge claim, 
this distribution of power is sufficient to explain why a knowledge claim 
is accepted. They do not consider the possibility that there are different 
kinds of interests in a given knowledge claim: the material interest of, for 
example, capitalists on the one hand, but on the other hand the contend- 
ing professional interests of scientists who have staked positions on oppo- 
site sides of a particular knowledge claim.’ Similarly, disciplines persist 
independent of the “external” society’s class interest, in part because they 
engender material and professional interests in their continued survival- 
a fact evident whenever a university tries to abolish, for example, its geog- 
raphy department. 
Even if we grant these weaknesses in the sociologists’ interpretation, 
scientific claims to a monopoly over certain truths cry out for challenge. 
The sociology of science has met this challenge, providing a thorough 
critique of the “myth” of scientific rationality, technical competence, and 
social authority. Ethnographic studies of science (see Knorr-Cetina & 
Mulkay, 1983 for an overview) have demystified the process by which sci- 
entists construct their knowledge claims by watching scientists create, 
construct, or find evidence and then seeing how they choose among al- 
ternative explanations for the evidence they have. What matters, they 
argue, is not the relation between science and external reality, but the 
process of reflexive fabrication that yields science (Knorr-Cetina, 1983, 
pp. 118-19). 
Such work has produced a new approach, a constructivist sociology 
(CS) of science.’ Scientific beliefs are socially constructed, and changes 
in scientific beliefs arise from social and social psychological factors- 
they do not reflect successively better models of “reality.” CS has domi- 
nated recent contributions to the sociology of science (i.e., Knorr, 1981; 
Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Mulkay, 1979; 
Woolgar, 1981). Even Mertonians now find parts of the constructivist 
position persuasive (i.e., Cole, 1992). 
Constructivists argue that the boundaries between disciplines are 
important as the objects of political conflict, broadly defined. It is not by 
accident that physicians defend schools of medicine from schools of pub- 
lic health, that physicists look down on engineers and economists, or that 
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national academies of science are reluctant to admit social scientists. In 
the academic context, boundary struggles decide who controls the struc- 
ture of the curriculum, dissertation writing, tenure and promotion deci- 
sions, journals, university presses, and external funding sources (see Klein 
in this issue of Library Trends). There are economic, political, and profes- 
sional motives for all these boundaries.” 
Boundaries between academic divisions also make sociological sense. 
For instance, Pierre Bourdieu (1975) argues that the division between 
the natural sciences and the social sciences may be the natural outgrowth 
of class (or elite) domination: 
whereas the dominant class grants the natural sciences an autonomy 
corresponding to the interest it finds in the economic applications 
of scientific techniques . . . the dominant class has no reason to ex- 
pect anything from the social sciences-beyond, at best, a particu- 
larly valuable contribution to the legitimation of the established or- 
der and a strengthening of the arsenal of symbolic instruments of 
domination. (p. 36) 
Thus, the divisions must be understood in terms of their social purposes 
and not as the result of epistemological differences. 
For all its insight, constructivist sociology is not without its problems. 
To begin, we note that, because multiple constructions are possible and 
the ultimate construction is socially determined, constructivism “is based 
upon a relativist epistemological position and the argument that nature 
has very little, if any, influence on the development of the content of 
science” (Cole, 1992, p. ix). Karin Knorr-Cetina (1983), a leading propo- 
nent of CS, bluntly claims that the scientific laboratory is “not an estab- 
lishment designed to mimic nature” (p. 135). Harry Collins (1981) agrees 
that “the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construc- 
tion of scientific knowledge” (p. 3) .  Going further, it does not matter 
whether reality exists, for reality does not constrain our accounts of it 
(Woolgar, 1983). 
Some will find this relativism objectionable on its face, but let us 
limit ourselves to those objections relevant to the sociology of science. 
First, the claims of constructivist sociology become more difficult to de- 
fend when we look at knowledge claims accepted across many cultures or 
time periods. There is every reason to believe, then, that CS and all 
sociological approaches exaggerate the social explanation for scientific 
beliefs held in many places and at many times. One such belief is that 
science naturally falls into recognizable fields or disciplines. Because 
there is a justifiable foundation for this belief, certain principles of disci- 
plinary organization and patterns of cross disciplinary organization make 
sense on epistemological grounds. 
Epistemology constrains cross disciplinary synthesis, a topic that 
constructivist sociology has not yet examined (Goldman, 1995). Like 
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most sociologies of knowledge, CS examines the construction of scien-
tific fields or continued knowledge production within boundaries. Yet 
these are exactly those cases where sociological variables are most impor- 
tant, because knowledge production in a given scientific field takes place 
within an established social structure. Inside a discipline, existing ad- 
ministration, professional associations, professional socialization, and 
gatekeeping by the powerful all affect knowledge production. 
Since they have studied disciplinary knowledge, it is not surprising 
that contemporary sociologists have taken a skeptical view of science. Their 
conclusions might be different if they were to study the destruction of 
scientific fields, or processes such as boundary crossing, the migration of 
subfields, the reorganization of knowledge, or the partial destruction of 
two fields that later merge and create a new hybrid body of knowledge. 
Reality seems to play an important role in these cases. 
Another weakness of the constructivists is that constructivist sociol- 
ogy cannot explain why anyone takes science seriously. Fairness requires 
that we grant our subjects at least as much understanding of their inter- 
ests as we claim for observers such as us. If sociologists can see that reality 
does not constrain scientific narratives, then the producers and consum- 
ers of those narratives should realize the same thing. This insight may 
not stop cynical knowledge producers from producing science that they 
know to be unconstrained by reality, but i t  should prevent governments, 
foundations, and other scientists from believing any of the accounts thus 
produced. 
As this point suggests, constructivist sociology must deny the norms 
and belief systems of science. This is odd for a relativist position, which is 
value neutral with respect to every other kind of belief (Pahre, 1995). 
This denial can even help interrogate constructivism, for CS cannot ex- 
plain its own efforts to develop a “true” account of how science is con-
structed. If reality does not constrain scientists’ accounts of reality, then 
so too science must not constrain sociologists’ accounts of science. If this 
is true, then why do constructivist ethnographers study real scientists in 
Jonas Salk’s lab? 
Finally, and most relevant for the subject of this issue, constructivism 
makes a mockery of information science. First, following constructivist soci- 
ology would require information providers to achieve a heroic level of cyni- 
cism. It asks them to provide information with which scientists can construct 
accounts of reality while also asking them to believe that this information 
will not constrain scientists’ accounts of reality. Second, CS implies that there 
will be no systematic relationship between patterns of information organiza- 
tion and patterns of scientific organization (since scientific organization is 
not predicated on reality or evidence about reality). 
There is, of course, a middle ground position that allows for a mean- 
ingful constructivist sociology, though it is different from existingversions. 
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Goldman (1987) argues that “while students of science and culture may 
properly abstract from the truth of the ideational contents they study, 
they do not and should not extrude the question of truth from their own 
propositions about the growth, prevalence, and extinction of people’s 
ideational contents” (p. 126). In other words, CS should admit that it 
seeks “true” knowledge claims about knowledge, and that real knowledge 
communities do play some role in the construction of knowledge about 
knowledge. When we grant this, then CS must also allow for the possibil- 
ity that reality exists and affects scientists’ accounts of it-i.e., science is 
not purely a social construction. At the same time, society does shape 
science. This brings us to our next question: Given that society con- 
strains our accounts of reality, how do we ever produce true knowledge? 
A SOCIALEPISTEMOLOGY 
The previous section argued that sociologists must take note of the 
role that reality plays in shaping scientific narratives. Yet, as the first sec- 
tion argued, reality and other epistemic concerns do not, by themselves, 
explain knowledge and knowledge communities. Social forces, too, shape 
our accounts of reality. Social epistemology examines this problem, ana- 
lyzing those social structures that are more (or less) likely to encourage 
conversion to “true” scientific beliefs than are other social structures.” 
This project only makes sense if there is a (partially) knowable reality 
against which to evaluate knowledge claims. Since the social epistemol- 
ogy project is in part empirical, it is no surprise that it is grounded in 
something other than a classical epistemology. A “naturalized philoso- 
phy” (Quine, 1969; Giere, 1985) or an “evolutionary epistemology” 
(Campbell & Paller, 1989) are common starting points. 
While a social epistemology does not seek to explain the shape of 
knowledge communities, it does highlight certain patterns or biases in 
the knowledge held by communities; an epistemological sociology can 
then show how these patterns help shape the community. To the extent 
that scientists find themselves in communities that foster the pursuit of 
true beliefs, we should see an explosion of knowledge. The epistemo- 
logical characteristics of this knowledge should affect the form scientific 
communities take. To the extent that scientists are in communities whose 
organization hinders the pursuit of true knowledge, epistemology will 
play less of a role in shaping communities. Presumably, social factors will 
be more important. 
The problem of nonmainstream research is a straightforward example 
of how this might work. Peer review authorities seem to be systematically 
biased against nonmainstream work in general and academic whistle-blow- 
ing in particular (see Moran 8c Mallory, 1991). This conflicts with scien- 
tific norms and biases knowledge production. This bias, in turn, makes it 
look as if mainstream approaches are better explanations of the world 
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than they really are. This apparent “success” of the mainstream gives 
greater intellectual authority to powerful scientists in the mainstream, 
helping them retain control of gatekeeping roles such as peer review 
authorities. Mainstream science advances within these limits but is inevi- 
tably incomplete. 
Another example is the existence of disciplinary boundaries. To 
defend boundaries, scientists highlight certain claims while obscuring 
others. For instance, a cultural anthropologist studying reciprocal gift 
giving will tend to downplay forces of supply and demand influencing 
the relative value of different goods in order to emphasize the social po- 
sitions of the two participants; an economist studying the same phenom- 
enon will downplay or ignore the social position of the people involved 
and highlight the relative prices of the goods. 
In such cases, what one discipline ignores are exactly those processes 
that are part of other disciplines, a process known as “ontological gerry- 
mandering” (Pawluch & Woolgar, 1985; Fuller, 1988, p. 197). One ex- 
ample of how boundaries exclude extradisciplinary factors is the sociol- 
ogy of science itself (compare Delamont, 1987). Mertonian sociology, 
following Parsonian sociology, showed a concern for norms, socializa- 
tion, and social structure as influences on science. Challenges to this 
position became increasingly important with the work of Thomas Kuhn 
(1962),a physicist turned historian of science, whose researches fall out- 
side sociology proper.12 Ethnomethodology, a sociological field with roots 
outside the discipline (Mullins, 1973), also became an important source 
of new approaches to the sociology of science and a major influence on 
constructivist sociology. One effect of these new approaches was that the 
sociology of science excluded normative research, leaving that to the phi- 
losophers. The philosophers, for their part, had turned away from a con- 
cern with real knowledge communities. In short, “[aln implicit agree- 
ment seems to have been made to let the sociologists concern themselves 
only with what actually passes as knowledge in particular cases, while the 
epistemologists take care of what ought to pass as knowledge in general” 
(Fuller, 1988, p. 263). 
A second example of interest here is gerrymandering in the study of 
academic information retrieval and exchange (Stoan, 1991). While soci- 
ologists study informal methods of research, such as “invisible colleges,” 
librarians study researchers’ use of formal research methods such as bib- 
liographies, indexes, and abstracts. Neither type of study alone can ex- 
plain why younger scholars rely more heavily on formal research sources 
yet make less use of formal sources as their careers progress. A unified 
approach could explain this, arguing that scholars are less closely tied to 
informal networks early in their careers and therefore are forced to rely 
more on formal sources of information. We do not have such an ap- 
proach because of where the academic boundary is drawn. 
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Crossing these gerrymandered boundaries can play an important 
positive role in knowledge production. As scientists move outside their 
original scientific communities, social pressures are less constraining. This 
leaves scientists more open to conversion. While such conversion is not 
necessarily a sign of having adopted “true” beliefs, conversion that cuts 
across social pressures is better evidence of persuasiveness than conver- 
sion stemming from socialization within a particular discipline. 
Similarly, informed observers in a different community are a useful 
judge of the likely validity of some set of scientific statements. Campbell 
(1994) gives the example of applied plant and animal breeders and doc- 
tors assembling family histories of specific disorders, both of whom were 
important for Mendelian genetics: “Because of their lack of prior com- 
mitment and lack of membership in partisan thought collectives, these 
groups have less social influence on them against adopting the new para- 
digm” (p. xviii). Similar kinds of arguments are to be found in more 
philosophical approaches, where the clash of rival paradigms or research 
programs (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970) leads more or less to survival of 
the fittest.I3 The argument is directly analogous to Mills’s belief in the 
free exchange of ideas. 
Such arguments might lead one to conclude that crossing bound- 
aries always makes innovative knowledges more likely (Dogan & Pahre, 
1990), while remaining within boundaries always risks producing 
nontruthful knowledges. Alas, life is never so simple. Women’s studies is 
a good illustration of some tensions evident in boundary crossing and in 
the cross-validation of multiple communities. Prior to the development 
of women’s studies, existing academic organizations often excluded 
women and many issues important to feminists. Social factors such as 
sexism clearly played a role in shaping existing disciplines and in exclud- 
ing research by, for, and about women. Just as clearly, scholarship re- 
sponding to feminist challenges makes some knowledge claims that are 
clearly “more true” than the previous knowledge ~1aims.I~ 
For these reasons, women’s studies intentionally challenged existing 
organizational forms, though it was far from clear what the organizational 
solution was (for brief histories see Boxer, 1982; Klein, 1990, pp. 95-98; 
Sheridan, 1990). Should feminist scholars build women’s studies as an 
interdisciplinary field or should they work to transform existing disci- 
plines from within? Either choice entailed boundaries and thus the im- 
plicit exclusion of something (Gunew, 1990, pp. 25-31). Each choice also 
has implications for scholars outside the boundaries-if women’s studies 
became a separate department, other departments in the university might 
well remain unchanged by feminist scholarship. 
As these examples show, even “interdisciplinary” fields have bound- 
aries that are constructed and defended in some way. While they can 
transform knowledge, interdisciplinarity offers only temporary emanci- 
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pation from boundaries. Understanding knowledge communities requires 
studying both the social forces behind boundaries and the truth-seeking 
efforts to transform them. This dynamic interaction between social con- 
straint and truth seeking is central to the next section. 
AN EPISTEMOLOGICALSOCIOLOGY 
Scientists are positivist, realist, and empiricist, and they believe that 
we can construct narratives that reflect objective reality. They believe 
that the purpose of science is to collect data, test hypotheses, and con- 
struct theories about the real world. Because scientific beliefs reflect re- 
ality, and scientific methods and theories help science better compre- 
hend reality, these beliefs, methods, and theories must affect both scien- 
tific behavior and social organization. This claim is central to this author’s 
epistemological sociology (Pahre, 1996) and Schmaus, Segerstrale, and 
Jesseph’s (1992) “Hard Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowl- 
edge” (see also Fuller, 1988, pp. 263-75). 
Of course, social factors both internal and external to science also 
affect these communities, so this approach is not simply yet another ex- 
ample of a (discredited) normative sociology (see Collins, 1992). To see 
how this works, consider a commonly cited example-multidisciplinary 
teams doing “problem-focused research.” This is (applied) research on 
a particular problem, usually a social problem of some sort. Understand- 
ing where these problems originate requires some sociological under- 
standing of researchers’ connections to the outside world. Yet the justifi- 
cation for multidisciplinary teams is epistemological, an argument that 
we cannot solve problems that straddle several disciplines without seek- 
ing true information from each (Ben-David, 1973; de Bie, 1970; 
Heckhausen, 1972). This is especially true, the argument runs, for clini- 
cal care (Klein, 1990, pp. 140-55). The social need for a certain kind of 
knowledge, combined with the ‘‘epistemological’’ rules for pursuing this 
kind of multidisciplinary knowledge, combine to produce a particular 
form of knowledge community, the multidisciplinary team. 
Next we will turn to an extended example of where the epistemo- 
logical sociology approach can take us. We will begin with the claim that 
disciplines are organized according to their dependent variables, which 
make up the facts with which their discipline is concerned.” This is true 
(1)for social reasons, because society wants certain sets of problems solved 
or facts explained; and (2) for epistemological reasons, because scientific 
norms lead scientists to explain facts, where they know the facts in ad- 
vance but not the explanations. Once organized into disciplinary com- 
munities, scientists develop hypotheses and theories to explain the facts 
that their community studies. 
Given this construction of disciplines, any theory claiming to be use- 
ful to a discipline must be germane to that discipline-i.e., it must explain 
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some subset of the new discipline’s existing set of data. Sociologists will 
not borrow the apparently true statements of quantum mechanics from 
physics unless these statements say something about sociological data. 
Social forces arise to defend boundaries, so “facts” will persist longer within 
a knowledge community than either “hypotheses” or “theories” (com- 
pare Campbell & Paller, 1989, p. 242)-facts are more essential to the 
maintenance of these boundaries. 
There arise, then, multiple scientific communities, each seeking hypoth- 
eses and theories to explain the facts in their disciplines. Some of these sets 
are likely to overlap for two reasons. First, any system of classlfylng facts is a 
social construction. One good example is the different taxonomies found in 
Western science and among the Karam aborigines (Barnes, 1983). The West 
classifies bats as mammals and cassowaries as birds; Karam classifies (flight- 
less) cassowaries as animals and (flying) bats as birds. Karam makes the 
“flying” characteristic central to its schema, while the West classifies accord- 
ing to genetic or evolutionary relationships. Both taxonomies are equally 
logical, so social needs decide which taxonomy governs-genetic relation- 
ships being most important to the West, behavioral characteristics to the 
Karam. Because classification schemata are (epistemologically) arbitrary, 
there is no reason why a given object need belong exclusively to a single 
discipline. For these reasons, we find many dependent variables to be ger- 
mane in more than one discipline. Klein, in this issue of Library Trends,gives 
examples of crime (economics, sociology, political science, and others), pov- 
erty (economics, sociology, political science, women’s studies), and disease 
(medicine, public health). 
A second reason several disciplines explain some of the same facts is 
that any fact is open to multiple interpretations by the Duhem-Quine 
thesis. Multiple explanations of the same fact are ubiquitous in science- 
for instance, the choice between two or more plausible explanations is at 
the heart of most scientific controversies. It is less frequently remem- 
bered that there can be not only multiple interpretations of the same 
facts, but multiple consistent logical systems-such as non-Euclidian ge- 
ometries-each incompatible with the other. Scientific controversies 
need not end with one interpretation victorious but may produce two or 
more internally consistent bodies of theory.16 
The appearance of the same “fact” in more than one discipline is an 
obvious inducement to interaction between fields. Let us consider two 
forms of interaction: (1)the exchange of data detached from theory, and 
(2) the exchange of hypotheses designed to explain some data. 
As epistemological sociology would expect, the epistemological dif- 
ference between data and hypothesis leads to different kinds of commu- 
nity. Borrowing data, for instance, does nothing to create community 
between disciplines. The same data can appear in multiple fields without 
changing them at all, no matter where the data came from. The com- 
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mon use of economic data does not create a community between politi- 
cal scientists and economists or between sociologists and economists. 
The exchange of hypotheses, on the other hand, can create commu- 
nity. Because the sets of objects studied by different disciplines overlap, 
scientists always have an inducement to exchange hypotheses. This fol- 
lows directly from scientists’ beliefs about what they are doing and can 
take several different forms. First, one discipline might borrow another 
discipline’s hypotheses and use them to explain some data in the bor- 
rower discipline not found in the lender discipline. For instance, in the 
1950s and 1960s, many anthropologists and political scientists found 
Parsonian sociology useful and borrowed this theory for their own pur- 
poses. Second, any lender discipline that observes this borrowing might 
find the borrower discipline’s facts interesting and might simply incorpo- 
rate any data into its own field that these hypotheses explained in the 
borrower field. For instance, there are now economic explanations of 
family structure so the discipline of economics now includes data about 
families and society without such data being excluded from sociology. 
This appropriation of data might make part of the borrower field 
appear as an outgrowth of the lender field. When this occurs, observers 
will describe an “imperialist” discipline that enters the subject matter of 
neighboring fields. Political economy is a good example, driven by the 
theoretical imperialism of economics (Hirshleifer, 1985). A sizable eco- 
nomic literature now explains economic regulation, a topic originally 
germane to political science. By this process of incorporation, economic 
policies have become part of the explanandum of economics, which has 
expanded to include them. Economic fields such as the “economics of 
regulation” or “endogenous tariff theory” now explain politics in eco- 
nomic terms. 
Because facts define a scientific field and hypotheses are tightly linked 
to facts, borrowing results can also lead directly to the creation of a new 
scientific field. There are two possibilities here: the two fields may merge 
entirely, as did botany and zoology in 1945-1955,or the exchange of re- 
sults may lead to the creation of a new hybrid field that defines itself by 
the facts at the interstices of the parent disciplines. 
Perhaps the largest hybrid field is historical sociology, where sociol- 
ogy and history interact to produce results that are useful to the other 
(see Dogan & Pahre, 1990,pp. 187-201). The community is so large that 
there exists subcommunities depending on different kinds of ties to the 
outside. For instance, the school of the Annales pursues multidisciplinary 
studies of the long durie. Grounded in communities of historians, this 
school attempts to use social scientific and natural scientific results as 
part of the reconstruction of particular historical social structures. 
It is easy to multiply such examples because the exchange of hypoth- 
eses is a bread-and-butter form of interaction across scientific boundaries 
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(see Campbell, 1969; Dogan & Pahre, 1990; Klein, 1990). It changes the 
boundaries of existing fields and may lead one field to subsume another 
or two fields to merge into a hybrid. Though closely tied to data, this is 
very different from the mere exchange of data, with different implica- 
tions for community. The exchange makes perfect sense in terms of sci- 
entific beliefs in positivism and realism, according to which scientists seek 
explanations of reality in a variety of places. 
There are also borrowings entirely divorced from data. For instance, 
it is possible to borrow assumptions and deductions derived from them 
completely detached from facts. A borrowing detached from facts is es- 
pecially evident when the theory is couched in mathematical terms and a 
field borrows only the mathematical terms (see also Pahre, 1996). An 
interesting example is the borrowing of Newton’s inverse-square law by 
international trade theorists in economics. Jan Tinbergen (1962) and 
Pentti Poyhonen (1963) saw this as a useful way to estimate trade volumes 
between countries. Their initial insight was to relabel the algebra and 
create a “gravity model” of international trade in which force is reinter- 
preted as bilateral trade volume, mass becomes the GNP of any two coun-
tries, and the distance between these countries has an inverse-square ef- 
fect on trade. These “gravity models” describe trade flows better than 
any other theory we know, despite having no connection at all to eco-
nomic theories of international trade (see Learner & Stern, 1970, chap. 
6; Deardorff, 1984). 
Such borrowings rest on the language of metaphor. Metaphorical 
communities may emerge, but successful innovation in a metaphorical 
community is a less predictable matter. Certainly physicists and econo- 
mists will not find any ground for a community in the above example. 
The difficulty of forming metaphorical communities is inexplicable in 
terms of constructivist sociology but makes sense for epistomological so-
ciology because it relies on distinctions among data, hypothesis, and math- 
ematical language that are important to scientific epistemology. 
The exchange of research methods also does little to create commu- 
nity. Statistical methods are a good example. Any concept or method 
from the field of statistics-i.e., the description of a Gaussian distribu- 
tion, sampling rules, Bayesian inferences, and hundreds more-is sub-
stantively empty; it matters not whether one is counting gold mine pro- 
duction, deaths in war, or quasar emissions. In other words, such meth- 
ods are not at all linked to facts. Yet such concepts, and the methods for 
applying or manipulating them, are enormously useful and have spread 
from discipline to discipline. Despite their importance, they do not cre- 
ate communities or disciplines, which are always organized around de- 
pendent variables. 
Let us conclude this section by contemplating some implications of 
epistomological sociology for information science. Facts are stable and 
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central to the construction of disciplinary boundaries. Designing infor- 
mation systems that respect these disciplinary boundaries makes sense. 
Still, information systems are themselves social constructions and help 
strengthen these boundaries, not challenge them. 
Facilitating the exchange of hypotheses is a matter of helping commu- 
nication among “neighbors.” While there are likely to be many problems in 
practice, in principle it is easy to see that monetary policy will interest econo- 
mists and political scientists, peasant villages will interest anthropologists and 
sociologists, and speech recognition will interest linguists and psychologists. 
The relevant communities can help information providers recognize these 
needs; though research in psycholinguistics might be classified as part of 
either psychology or linguistics, researchers need hardly be told to look in 
both places for recent contributions to the field. 
The primary obstacles to information science’s efforts to cultivate 
the exchange of hypotheses are likely to be social. Hybrid fields conflict 
with socially constructed boundaries that are embedded in fiscal con- 
straints, administrative divisions, and academic politics (see Searing’s ar- 
ticle in this issue of Library Trends). When forced to choose between allo- 
cating resources to facilitate research at the interstices of disciplines or 
giving resources to support research at the discipline’s core, most admin- 
istrators will emphasize the core. 
In contrast, the major obstacles to metaphorical communities are 
epistemological. We are not very used to thinking about them, and it is 
hard to imagine how information science might facilitate exchange in 
this area. Complexity theory, also known as chaos theory (see Gleick, 
1987),is a good example of these difficulties. The core of this cluster of 
theories is the methodological principle that apparently chaotic behav- 
ior can be patterned in complex ways, and that we should model this 
behavior from the “bottom up” and then look for patterns. For instance, 
some lines of computer code might simulate the rules guiding an ant, a 
migrating bird, nations at war, protein synthesis, or a weather system. 
The computer can then simulate how a large number of these units would 
behave in interaction with each other, and the scientist can scan this be- 
havior for patterns such as flocking behavior in birds or the way that ants 
sort different kinds of trash. 
What makes complexity theory a challenge is the diverse applica- 
tions possible with this method (my seemingly random list above is taken 
from real research). A recent graduate course on complexity theory in 
my political science department had students from chemistry, computer 
science, mathematics, psychology, and political science; colleagues in this 
area interact with biologists, economists, sociologists, and many other 
disciplines. There is no obvious way to connect a would-be user in the 
study of war to information such as the Lorenz equations, originally writ- 
ten to simulate the behavior of a water wheel. 
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CONCLUSIONS: AN EPISTEMOLOGICALTOWARD SOCIOLOGY 
RESEARCHPROGRAM 
While there are many challenges for information science raised by 
the study of crossdisciplinary communication, this discussion will con- 
clude with what this author sees as the research program facing those 
doing epistemological sociology. After some years of research, we should 
then be in a much better position to think normatively about issues of 
concern to universities, science policy makers, and information service 
providers. 
First, this research program needs a more fully developed epistemol- 
ogy. Institutional and social organization, social-psychological pressures, 
politics, and economic incentives all shape the pursuit of knowledge, and 
social epistemology is well poised to explain how such social processes 
help or hinder efforts to develop a better understanding of the real world. 
A foundationalist epistemology cannot explain changing constructions 
of truth-seeking disciplines and their boundaries in the same way that a 
social epistemology can. These changing constructions are, in turn, an 
important source of sociological change in an epistemological sociology. 
The second task for epistemological sociology is to develop a large 
body of hypotheses about how epistemology shapes scientific organiza- 
tion. The ES reaction to constructivism risks making the following kind 
of argument: scientific norms matter, so ifwe observe scientists we should 
see them seeking truth in accordance with those norms. There are two 
problems here. First, the argument does not add any information to our 
understanding of science since we have assumed norms in order to ex- 
plain norm-driven behavior. More seriously, any empirical study based 
on such an argument will likely be tautologous, deriving the norms only 
from the study of normative behavior and then using these derived norms 
from the very same behavior. 
To avoid these problems, hypotheses are proposed here that con- 
nect norms with social organization, mostly about cross-boundary com- 
munitie~.~’These hypotheses should be compared to existing models of 
these communities, such as specialization-fragmentation-hybridization 
(Dogan & Pahre, 1990), or a spatial model of islands and archipelagoes 
(Berger, 19’72; Garfield & Small, 1985). These models are not mutually 
exclusive, but we have not yet asked under what circumstances a particu- 
lar model will fit one field or another. It is at least as important to start 
asking which models do not fit particular fields and which models do not 
seem to fit very many fields at all. 
As this suggests, it is time for sociologists of science to buckle down 
and pit contending approaches against each other in empirical tests. 
Warren Schmaus et al. (1992; also compare Collins, 1992) note that “so-
cial students of science do not seem to think it necessary to eliminate 
alternative explanations and demonstrate the superiority of their own 
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explanation; theyjust argue their own specific case” (p. 249). For those of us 
who grant that theory testing is meaningful-as positivists or as social episte- 
mologists-this lack of testing is an undesirable state of affairs. Because these 
tests should be comparative-that is, against a rival paradigm or research 
program (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970)-it is helpful to pose epistemologcal 
sociology against the constructivist sociology of science.I8 
Another way to develop hypotheses is to treat norms not as a con- 
stant that structures society but as a variable that influences the structure 
of scientific society. For instance, scientific norms about the purpose of 
research are much stronger than norms about the purpose of making 
university appointments (where scientific ability and nonscientific norms 
such as teaching, mentoring, or diversity all play a role). We should also 
expect the effects of scientific norms to be more obvious in 
crossdisciplinary science. Very powerful social forces, crystallized as dis- 
ciplinary boundaries, may well overwhelm these norms as an explana- 
tion of disciplinary and intradisciplinary organization. 
Whatever the details, this is an exciting area of research. Looking at 
both the social constraints on knowledge and the way that knowledge 
transforms communities forces the scholar to be reflexive and self-criti- 
cal. At the same time, this research also highlights the creative and trans- 
formative potential latent in existing social structures and communities. 
NOTES 
Similarly, connecting information to end-users is notjust a technological problem but a 
sociological one. However, librarians typically think about meeting the needs of infor- 
mation users in terms of technological fixes-better abstracting, indexing, online search 
capabilities-instead of social solutions. 
Throughout this paper I use “epistemology” as a shorthand that includes much that is 
not only epistemological but also ontological or hermeneutical. For instance, this “epis- 
temology” also includes scientists’ ontological beliefs that reality exists and hermeneutical 
guidelines about uncovering the secrets of that reality. I also use the term to include the 
process of dividing the scientific toolkit into “data,” “methods,” “theory,” and other more- 
or-less exclusive categories. 
Another implication of the sociological study of disciplines stems from the fact that mem- 
bers of the different divisions (engineering, humanities, natural sciences, social sciences) 
search for information in different ways. While all rely heavily on informal networks, 
bibliographic searches are much more important in the natural sciences, while library 
accession lists and publishers’ catalogs are much more important in the humanities (Stoan, 
1991). Thus, studying scientific communities is important not only in order to under- 
stand the informal information sources that stand as alternatives to librarians’ formal 
sources, but also to understand the origins and likely persistence of the differences in 
the use of formal sources. These issues will not be addressed here. 
For seven examples of failed foundationalist attempts to mark off the human sciences, 
see Fuller (1988, pp.197-201). For review of the argument distinguishing knowing from 
unknowing objects, see Harbers & de Vries, 1993 and Lynch, 1993. 
Laudan’s (1977) critique of those who try to demarcate science from non-science is tell- 
ing, for each philosopher tried to design criteria to exclude specific beliefs that he finds 
objectionable: Aristotle excluded Hippocratic medicine, Carnap ruled out Bergsonian 
metaphysics, and Popper put Freud and Marx beyond the Pale. 
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Fuller (1988), too, notes that “history tells against the systematic approach” to organiz- 

ing disciplines (p. 196). 

For an example of how a highly critical external audience shapes research in the hu- 

manities, see Messer-Davidow (forthcoming). 

We must also consider the interests of “users” (Fuller, 1987, pp. 157-58), such as those 

who accept (use) claims about materials, forces, and stress in order to assert claims about 

architecture. It is impossible to explain the persistence of knowledge claims in the face 

of social change without considering a broad range of such “interests.” 

Numerous variations exist within this general position, including constructivists (Knorr- 

Cetina, 1983),discourse analysts (Mulkay et al., 1983), ethnomethodologists (Lynch et 

al. 1983),postmodernists, and the like. I take this term to include a large cluster ofpost- 

modern, post-structuralist, ethnomethodological, deconstructing, and discourseuriented 





lo For nonconstructivist discussions of the social nature of disciplines, see, among others, 
Bauer (1990),Recher (1990, 1994),Campbell (1979), Pinch (1990). 
Donald T. Campbell (1969, 1986, 1989, 1994) calls this project a “Sociology of Scientific 
Validity” (SSV),while Coldman uses the term ”veritism” for the evaluation of social prac- 
tices according to their production of true beliefs. The project is also central to the 
journal SocialEpistrmology and editor Steve Fuller’s (1988) book of the same name, and I 
have followed the nomenclature of that community here. 
l 2  It might also he interesting to think about the political aims of the sociology of science: 
( I )  to debunk the achievements of the natural sciences in order to make the natural 
sciences resemble the social sciences, who would then share in the higher prestige ofthe 
natural sciences; (2) to buttress the position of sociology as a discipline capable of under- 
standing “reality” ohjectivelv, and thus something different than the less prestigious sub-
jective disciplines of the humanities. 
13 Social epistemology need not he this panglossian, of course. Compare Fuller’s (1988) 
statement of the task: “[Mlost of the cognitive utopias of the philosophers involve activi- 
ties such as inspecting the logical structure of arguments and replicating the experi- 
ments of one’s colleagues, which are simply impossible to enforce on a systematic basis in 
the world of Big Science” (p. 268). Thus, understanding the social constraints on repli- 
cation is a necessary condition for a normative epistemology. 
l4 For a trite example, consider those newer truth claims in medical studies that are drawn 
from the population of both women and men. These are an advance on pre-existing 
studies, which generally excluded women from the sample even for studying medical 
problems suffered mostly by women. 
l5 Throughout this essay1 will treat “facts,” data, and objects as unproblematic and as some- 
how prior to theory. This is a simplification, to say the least. Someone “discovers” cer- 
tain facts for certain purposes and not some other imaginable Facts, and we describe 
these facts in one language and not another. 
l6  If internally consistent, each must be incomplete, by Giidel’s Theorem. 
l7For a different kind of example, in which the interaction of truth-seeking and citation 
maximization goals produce particular patterns of replication in high and low status 
journals, see Feigenhaum and Levy (1993). 
This is not quite afair test because constructivists reject the positivist project of theory testing. 
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